Jay N. Krehbiel - University at Buffalo (SUNY) - Associate Professor of Political Science

Jay N. Krehbiel
Associate Professor of Political Science
University at Buffalo (SUNY)

CV

Contact Information
University at Buffalo (SUNY)
Department of Political Science
520 Park Hall
Buffalo, NY 14260

E-mail: jaykrehb@buffalo.edu
Phone: 918.430.4624
Office: Park Hall 518

I am an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University at Buffalo (SUNY). Prior to coming to UB, I was a faculty in the political science department at West Virginia University and received my PhD in Political Science from Washington University in St. Louis, where I was a graduate associate for the Center for Empirical Research in the Law (CERL). In Fall 2019, I was a Fulbright Scholar at the PluriCourts Centre at the University of Oslo. My research lies at the intersection of judicial politics and public opinion, with a focus on public support for courts – domestic and international – and its effects on judicial behavior. This has led me to work on several topics, including the decision making of European constitutional courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union, the efficacy of legal institutions and norms like public support for the rule of law, as a democratic guardrail, and the dynamics of public support for judicial institutions among Indigenous peoples.

My research appears in outlets such as the American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, British Journal of Political Science, International Organization, and Journal of Law and Courts. I am also co-author of the forthcoming book The Efficacy of Judicial Review: The Rule of Law and the Promise of Independent Courts (with Cambridge University Press) with Amanda Driscoll and Michael Nelson. My research has been supported by, among others, the National Science Foundation, West Virginia Humanities Council, and the West Virginia University Humanities Center.

Originally from Oklahoma, I am a proud citizen of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma. When not working, I can usually be found with my family, hiking, camping, running, or watching sports, particularly the St. Louis Cardinals and Fulham FC of the English Premier League.

For more information on my work, take a look at my CV and the papers listed below. To get in touch with me, I am available at jaykrehb@buffalo.edu.

Research

Peer-Reviewed Publications

The Politics of Judicial Procedures: The Role of Public Oral Hearings in the German Constitutional Court. 2016. American Journal of Political Science 60 (4): 990-1005.
Abstract
Modern liberal democracies typically depend on courts with the power of constitutional review to ensure that elected officials do not breach their constitutional obligations. The efficacy of this review, however, can depend on the public observing such breaches. One resource available to many of the world's constitutional courts to influence the public's ability to do so is public oral hearings. Drawing on the comparative judicial literature on separation of powers, public awareness, and noncompliance, I develop a formal model of public oral hearings. The model provides empirical implications for when a court will hold public oral hearings and how hearings correspond to a court's willingness to rule against elected officials. An empirical analysis of hearings at the German Constitutional Court supports the model's prediction that courts use hearings as a resource to address potential noncompliance.
BibTeX Citation
```
@article{Krehbiel_Hearings,
  title={The Politics of Judicial Procedures: The Role of Public Oral Hearings in the German Constitutional Court},
  author={Krehbiel, Jay N.},
  journal={American Journal of Political Science},
  volume={60},
  number={4},
  pages={990-1005},				       
  year={2016}
}
```

Elections, Public Awareness and the Efficacy of Constitutional Review. 2019. Journal of Law and Courts 7 (1): 53-79.
Abstract
Scholars have long recognized the importance of timing in political decision making. In this paper, I consider the potential for the strategic timing of court decisions involving the constitutional review of statutes. As courts lack the ability to directly implement their decisions, scholars have identified an attentive public as invaluable for judicial authority. Building on this literature, I argue that the proximity of a national election increases awareness and thereby creates an environment conducive to the assertive exercise of constitutional review. I then present evidence of the electoral cycle's effect on decision making at the German Federal Constitutional Court.
BibTeX Citation
```
@article{Krehbiel_JLC_elections,
  title={Elections, Public Awareness and the Efficacy of Constitutional Review},
  author={Krehbiel, Jay N.},
  journal={Journal of Law and Courts},
  volume={7},
  number={1},
  pages={53-79},
  year={2019}
}
```

Public Awareness and the Behavior of Unpopular Courts. 2021. British Journal of Political Science 51 (4): 1601-1619.
Abstract
Scholars have long debated the positive and negative consequences of an aware public for the quality of governance in modern liberal democracies. This paper extends this debate to the context of constitutional review by exploring how public awareness can limit the effective exercise of review by courts lacking strong public support. Incorporating aspects of both the legitimacy and separation of powers theories on judicial power, I argue that public awareness weakens the efficacy of such unpopular courts by creating an electoral incentive for governments to defy adverse rulings, even when doing so may lead to punishment from other institutional stakeholders. In this article, I develop a simple formal model that identifies how and under what conditions public awareness can influence an unpopular court's decision making. An analysis of rulings issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union finds support for the model's empirical implications.
BibTeX Citation
```
@article{Krehbiel_unpopular_courts,
  title={Public Awareness and the Behavior of Unpopular Courts},
  author={Krehbiel, Jay N.},
  journal={British Journal of Political Science},
  volume={51},
  number={4},
  pages={1601-1619},
  year={2021}
}
```

Strategic Delay and the Use of Incompatibility Rulings at the German Constitutional Court. 2021. Journal of Politics 83 (3): 821-833.
Abstract
Constitutional review has become a hallmark of modern liberal democracy. The efficacy of this review, however, is far from guaranteed. In this paper, I argue that courts promote compliance by using their discretion over the temporal effect of decisions invalidating legislation. Building on the comparative judicial politics literature on the separation of powers and strategic judicial behavior, I develop a theoretical account of how courts strategically delay the implementation of their decisions through the declaration of a statute's incompatibility with the constitution. The accompanying theoretical model's main prediction is that courts use this tactic when the incumbent government is electorally weak, as delaying compliance raises the probability of a new government taking office and subsequently implementing the decision. An empirical analysis of incompatibility rulings by the German Federal Constitutional Court supports the model’s predictions.
BibTeX Citation
```
@article{Krehbiel_delay,
  title={Strategic Delay and the Use of Incompatibility Rulings at the German Constitutional Court},
  author={Krehbiel, Jay N.},
  journal={Journal of Politics},
  volume={83},
  number={3},
  pages={821-833},
  year={2021}
}
```

Do Voters Punish Noncompliance with High Court Rulings? A Cross-National Analysis. 2021. Politics 41 (2): 156-172.
Abstract
Understanding how high courts successfully constrain the state poses a puzzle central to the study of constitutional review. An increasingly popular answer to this puzzle is that voters electorally punish governments for noncompliance with judicial decisions. This paper conducts a cross-national analysis of the relationship between noncompliance and an incumbent government's electoral success. Using data from the Varieties of Democracy Project on noncompliance with the national high courts of 74 countries from 2007 to 2017, I examine whether voters systematically punish or reward noncompliance. The analysis reveals that noncompliance decreases an incumbent government's vote share in contexts with a strong pre-existing norm of compliance.
BibTeX Citation
@article{Krehbiel_noncompliance, title={Do Voters Punish Noncompliance with High Court Rulings? A Cross-National Analysis}, author={Krehbiel, Jay N.}, journal={Politics}, volume={41}, number={2}, pages={156-172}, year={2021} }

The COVID-19 Pandemic and Public Support for European Integration: Evidence from Germany, with Sivaram Cheruvu. 2021. Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy 2 (1): 63-80.
Abstract
The European Union increasingly relies on the willingness of citizens to support the delegation of authority from their national governments to European institutions. Major policy crises have the ability to profoundly shape public support and opposition to greater European integration. In this article, we consider the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for public support of greater European integration. We build on the utilitarian approaches to develop an account of the pandemic’s implications for citizens’ views on the need for more EU-level policy making. We contend that higher levels of concern for COVID-19 correspond to higher support for further European integration. We then go on to argue that this relationship is conditioned by ideology. We find support for our hypotheses using a nationally-representative survey of 4400 German respondents fielded in April and May 2020.
BibTeX Citation
@article{Krehbiel_Cheruvu_EU, title={The COVID-19 Pandemic and Public Support for EuropeanIntegration: Evidence from Germany}, author={Krehbiel, Jay N. and Sivaram Cheruvu}, journal={Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy}, volume={2}, number={1}, pages={63-80}, year={2021} }

Can International Courts Enhance Domestic Judicial Review? Separation of Powers and the European Court of Justice, with Sivaram Cheruvu. 2022. Journal of Politics 84(1): 258-275.
Abstract
How courts ensure the efficacy of their decisions poses one of the central challenges to the quality of modern liberal democracy. In this article, we consider how the ability of domestic courts to engage with their international counterparts through preliminary reference procedures can further this goal. Arguing that domestic courts use preliminary reference procedures to affect the probability their governments comply with adverse judicial decisions, we construct a formal model of the reference procedure and test a series of empirical implications with a novel dataset of domestic court cases involving the European Union's preliminary reference procedure. We find that courts are more likely to refer cases as the risk of noncompliance increases and that this relationship is conditioned by the level of public trust in the Court of Justice of the European Union and the position of a court in the domestic judicial hierarchy.
BibTeX Citation
@article{Krehbiel_Cheruvu_CJEU_References, title={Can International Courts Enhance Domestic Judicial Review?Separation of Powers and the European Court of Justice}, author={Krehbiel, Jay N. and Sivaram Cheruvu}, journal={Journal of Politics}, volume={84}, number={1}, pages={258-275}, year={2022} }

Delegation, Compliance, and Judicial Decision-making in the Court of Justice of the European Union. With Sivaram Cheruvu. 2022. Journal of Law and Courts 10(1): 113-138.
Abstract
Courts regularly delegate tasks to individual or small subsets of judges. While a substantial literature addresses delegation in the context of American courts, less is known about why and how courts delegate from a comparative perspective. With many of the world's high courts using chamber systems by which the court delegates cases to subsets of judges, this limitation of the extant literature leaves a number of empirical and theoretical questions unanswered. We argue that the threat of noncompliance presents one factor influencing the use chambers. From our expectation that cases with a greater risk for noncompliance will not be sent to chambers, we then derive empirical implications for case disposition and the willingness of a court to rule contrary to the legal merits in a case. An empirical analysis of chamber usage in preliminary reference cases at the Court of Justice of the European Union provides evidence supporting our account.
BibTeX Citation
@article{Krehbiel_Cheruvu_CJEU_Chambers, title={Delegation, Compliance, and Judicial Decision-making in Comparative Context}, author={Sivaram Cheruvu and Jay N. Krehbiel}, journal={Journal of Law and Courts}, volume={10}, number={1}, pages={113-138}, year={2022} }

The Politics of Panel Systems: Political Insurance and the Organization of High Courts. 2022. European Political Science 21(4): 522-536.
Abstract
A long tradition in political science holds that political institutions are designed for the benefit of the politicians who create them. Prominent among explanations for the creation and maintenance of effective judiciaries is the political insurance theory, which predicts higher levels of judicial independence where there is robust political competition. In this article, I consider the implications of political insurance theory for one of the most consequential organizational decisions for courts, the provision of panels or subsets of judges for rendering decisions. Identifying the ability of panels to provide political insurance, I contend that higher levels of political competition motivate the creation of panel systems in national high courts. An empirical analysis using an original dataset on the organic statutes of 106 high courts reveals a positive relationship between political competition and the use of panel systems, while further analysis shows that this relationship is limited to democracies.
BibTeX Citation
@article{Krehbiel_panels, title={The Politics of Panel Systems: Political Insurance and the Organization of High Courts}, author={Krehbiel, Jay N.}, journal={European Political Science}, volume={21}, number={4}, pages={522-536}, year={2022} }

Evaluating Excuses: How the Public Judges Noncompliance. With Amanda Driscoll, Michael J. Nelson and Taran Samarth. 2024. Journal of Behavioral Public Administration 6:(1-16).
Abstract
The political actors who make policy often delegate their implementation to others. Yet for a variety of reasons, ranging from intransigence to incompetence, political agents tasked with implementation may not faithfully implement policies. If those charged with implementa- tion can frame their noncompliance in a way that engenders sympathy, implementors may be able to disrupt the policymaking process with limited public backlash. We examine if the public’s willingness to excuse noncompliance varies with the implementing actor’s rationale for its failing to carry out the policy. Drawing on a survey experiment fielded in Germany, we find that the public is more sympathetic to resource-based, rather than principled, jus- tifications for noncompliance, though the size of the effect is small. Further, contrary to fears that the pandemic would decay democratic functioning by leading citizens to be more forgiving of emergency-based inaction, we find no evidence that the public is more accepting of noncompliance justified on the base of the pandemic.
BibTeX Citation
@article{dkns_schools, title={Evaluating Excuses: How the Public Judges Noncompliance}, author={Driscoll, Amanda, Jay N. Krehbiel, Michael J. Nelson, and Taran Samarth}, journal={Journal of Behavioral Public Administration}, volume={6}, pages={1-16}, year={2023} }

Do Preliminary References Increase Public Support for European Law? Experimental Evidence from Germany. With Sivaram Cheruvu. 2024. International Organization 78 (Winter): 170-187.
Abstract
Explanations for the successful expansion and consolidation of the European Union and its legal system have long emphasized the importance of domestic courts’ sending preliminary references to the Court of Justice. Key to many of these theoretical accounts is the claim that domestic courts are better equipped than the Court of Justice to compel national governments to comply with EU law. Integrating insights from the comparative judicial politics literature into the context of the EU's preliminary references system, we provide a theoretical and empirical foundation for this claim by arguing that incorporating domestic courts into the EU legal process enhances public support for expansive judicial interpretations of EU law. We go on to argue, however, that this transfer of legitimacy depends on citizens’ views of the national and European courts. We support our argument with evidence from a preregistered survey experiment fielded in Germany.
BibTeX Citation
@article{cheruvu_krehbiel_IO, title={Do Preliminary References affect Public Support for European Law? Experimental Evidence from Germany}, author={Cheruvu, Sivaram and Jay N. Krehbiel}, journal={International Organization}, volume={78}, number={Winter}, pages={170-187}, year={2024} }

Unmasking Support for Democratic Norms: Punishment and Partisanship in Comparative Perspective With Amanda Driscoll, Michael J. Nelson, and Sang Yeon Kim. 2024. European Journal of Political Research
Abstract
A growing body of research theorizes that partisanship can undermine democracy as citizens prioritize their political interests over abstract norms and values. We argue that crises might counteract intense partisanship by giving citizens clarity on the threats posed by rule of law violations. Examining the differential application of a law – a breach of democratic norms – we draw on an experiment embedded in representative surveys of Germany, the United States, Hungary and Poland to examine citizens’ sense of appropriate punishment for elites’ violation of a municipal mask-wearing ordinance. We find evidence of partisan bias in citizens’ willingness to support punishment in all four countries. But, in the two consolidated democracies, we find that concern about the Covid-19 crisis diminishes partisan biases in punishment preferences: citizens who are most concerned about the crisis also model the most consistency in their willingness to hold copartisans into account.
BibTeX Citation
@article{dnks_masks, title={Unmasking Support for Democratic Norms: Punishment and Partisanship in Comparative Perspective}, author={Driscoll, Amanda, Jay N. Krehbiel, Michael J. Nelson, and Sang Yeon Kim.}, journal={European Journal of Political Research}, year={2024} }

Partisanship, Pragmatism, or Idealism? Evaluating Public Support for Backlashes Against International Courts in Backsliding Democracies. With Sivaram Cheruvu and Samantha Mussell. 2024. Journal of European Public Policy
Abstract
With democratic backsliding spreading globally, international courts increasingly find themselves serving as democratic guardrails. This task poses a challenge, as national governments may attempt to punish international courts for trying to constrain their backsliding agendas. Since a government’s calculus for attacking a court is likely influenced by public opinion, we consider the impact of partisanship on the extent of public support for backlash against international courts in backsliding democracies. We theorise that support for backlash is driven by more than partisanship alone. For government partisans, support for backlash decreases with support for the international organisation to which the court belongs, while for opposition partisans it depends on their commitment to the democratic norms the court’s decision defends. We support our expectations by analysing original survey data collected from Hungary in March 2022, immediately following a major pro-democracy decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union.
BibTeX Citation
@article{ckm_backsliding, title={Partisanship, Pragmatism, or Idealism? Evaluating Public Support for Backlashes Against International Courts in Backsliding Democracies}, author={Cheruvu, Sivaram, Jay N. Krehbiel and Samantha Mussell}, journal={Journal of European Public Policy}, year={2024} }

The Efficacy of Judicial Review: The Rule of Law and the Promise of Independent Courts. Forthcoming Book Manuscript. With Amanda Driscoll and Michael J. Nelson. Cambridge University Press.
Abstract
Over the past century, countries around the globe have empowered constitutional courts on the promise that these institutions can safeguard the rule of law. When can courts effectively perform this vital task? Drawing upon a series of survey experiments fielded in the United States, Germany, Hungary, and Poland, we demonstrate that judicial independence is critical for judicial efficacy: independent courts are uniquely capable of animating citizens to punish executives who flout the rule of law while weak courts are unable to generate a public response.. Moreover, we find that those citizens most committed to the rule of law inflict the largest political penalties, even when partisan considerations are prominent. Critically though, judicial rulings do not bolster public acceptance of controversial policies; judicial power is intrinsically negative in this regard. Our results suggest that while judicial efficacy is neither universal nor automatic, courts—so long as they are viewed by the public as independent—can provide an effective check on executives to uphold the rule of law.

Native Americans' Support for Supreme Court Legitimacy. Forthcoming. Politics, Groups, and Identities.
Abstract
This paper presents a first-of-its-kind evaluation of the contributing factors to dif- fuse support for the U.S. Supreme Court among Native Americans. Despite the Court’s profound impact on the lives of Native Americans, scholars have largely overlooked the state of diffuse support for the high court among this understudied population. Building off of the long-established judicial legitimacy literature and recent additions examining the dynamics of diffuse support among African-Americans, the paper uses original survey data to demonstrate that Native Americans’ views toward the Court are influenced by a confluence of political, racial, and demographic concerns. These findings indicate that Native Americans’ diffuse support for the Court reflects long established understandings of the Supreme Court’s legitimacy and dynamics unique to racial minorities.
BibTeX Citation
@article{krehbiel_native_amer_diffuse, title={Native Americans' Support for Supreme Court Legitimacy}, author={Krehbiel, Jay N.}, journal={Politics, Groups, and Identities}, year={Forthcoming} }

Examining Native American Support for Federal Indian Policy: Evidence from the Indian Child Welfare Act. 2024 Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy 5(2): 285-304.
Abstract
From environmental policy to family law to law enforcement, Federal Indian policy affects nearly every facet of daily life for Native Americans. And yet, despite its significance, little is known about either the state of Native American attitudes toward Federal Indian policy or the factors that bolster or undermine support for these policies. In this paper, I examine Native Americans' support for Federal Indian policy by investigating this group's attitudes toward one of the most important and consequential pieces of Federal Indian policy, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Analyzing data from an original survey of 522 Native Americans conducted in May 2023, I show that support for ICWA is profoundly influenced by attachment to Native American identity and largely unaffected by partisanship. Additional analyses examining Native Americans' support for a different issue---affirmative action---further suggests that Native Americans differentiate their support for Federal Indian policy from other policy areas.
BibTeX Citation
@article{krehbiel_ICWA, title={Examining Native American Support for Federal Indian Policy: Evidence from the Indian Child Welfare Act}, author={Krehbiel, Jay N.}, journal={Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy}, volume={5}, number={2}, pages={285-304}, year={2024} }

Selected Working Papers

Institutions as Fire Alarms: Experimental Evidence on Public Policing of the Rule of Law. With Amanda Driscoll and Michael J. Nelson.
Abstract
To effectively constrain the state, citizens must recognize executive overreach and coordinate around an appropriate response. We consider whether democratic institutions - particularly legislatures and courts - can inform the public about executive overreach and shape citizens’ responses to it. Drawing on a survey fielded to a nationally representative sample of Germans, we find that acceptance of a legally-questionable executive action declines when the action is taken in defiance of a coequal branch of government, especially when the executive’s action is invalidated by a court, and especially amongst those with strong commitment to the rule of law. Favorable review from a legislature or court does not boost acceptance of a controversial executive action, but clearance from a court can blunt public disapproval of executive malfeasance. These findings are consequential for our understanding of how, and under what conditions, democratic norms and institutions can effectively constrain executives.
BibTeX Citation
@article{dkn_fire_alarms, title={Institutions as Fire Alarms: Experimental Evidence on Public Policing of the Rule of Law}, author={Driscoll, Amanda, Jay N. Krehbiel and Michael J. Nelson}, journal={Unpublished Manuscript}, year={2022} }

Does Fake News Efficacy Shape Electoral Engagement? Evidence from Hungary. With Laura Jakli, Matthew Stenberg, and Sivaram Cheruvu.
Abstract
Citizens’ ability to identify political bias and misinformation as they consume news—a concept known as fake news efficacy (FNE)—is an increasingly necessary skill for navigating modern information environments. FNE is particularly crucial in autocratizing countries, where media environments are no longer independent of government interference. Yet, we know little about how this skill might influence political behavior. In this study, we develop a theory of FNE as a form of political efficacy in autocratizing contexts, and then empirically test the relationship between FNE and electoral engage- ment using an original survey (n=2,000) fielded during the 2022 Hungarian national election. Our study is the first to show that FNE is strongly correlated with electoral engagement. We further show that this relationship is present for both government co-partisans and opponents but not for those who identify as non-partisan.
BibTeX Citation
@article{Hungary_fakenews, title={Does Fake News Efficacy Shape Electoral Engagement? Evidence from Hungary}, author={Laura Jakli, Matthew Stenberg, Sivaram Cheruvu, and Jay N. Krehbiel}, journal={Unpublished Manuscript}, year={2023} }

Selected Work in Progress

"Dynamics of Minority Support for the Supreme Court: Native Americans and the Brackeen v Haaland Decision'' (NSF RAPID Award SES-2315950)
Abstract
Public trust in the Supreme Court is vital for the health of American democracy. Recent controversies, however, have brought unprecedented challenges to the Court’s legitimacy. With trust in the Court at historic lows and recent research suggesting the Court’s legitimacy may be more fragile than previously thought, commentators and scholars alike are raising increasingly dire warnings that the Court’s decisions in highly salient cases have the potential to erode its foundation of public support. Largely missing from this growing discussion of the Court’s public standing, however, is the perspective of the country’s racial and ethnic minorities. As a result, it is unclear whether minority citizens continue to hold the Court in high regard and what impact, if any, the Court’s decisions have on that support.

To explore the dynamics of support for the Supreme Court among minority citizens, the project will employ a combination of survey research and elite interviews. A nationally-representative survey of Americans will provide insights into the state of public support for the Supreme Court, with an oversampling of African-American, Hispanic, and Native American respondents allowing for detailed analyses of the Court’s standing among minority citizens. To understand the effect of a significant Court decision on minority citizens’ views of the Court, the project will further focus on the attitudes of Native Americans. To do so, the project will leverage the Court’s anticipated 2023 ruling in a high profile case, Brackeen v Haaland, in two ways. First, Native American survey respondents will be recontacted after the Court’s decision with a second wave of the survey, thereby providing an opportunity to evaluate the impact of the ruling on the Court’s support among those most directly affected by the decision. Second, interviews with leaders of Native American tribes both before and after the Court’s decision will grant insights into the ruling’s impact on the views of minority communities’ political leaders. The findings from this research will yield important insights into the Supreme Court’s relationship with minorities at this critical juncture in American politics.

"Native American Support for the American Legal System'' (Book Proposal)
Abstract
In this book project, I explore the nature of Native Americans' attitudes toward legal norms and institutions. The project represents a first-of-its-kind systematic exploration of Native Americans’ attitudes toward important legal institutions, such as the Supreme Court and tribal courts, and legal norms, such as the rule of law. Using a combination of original survey data---including survey experiments and a two-wave panel study---and interviews with tribal leaders, the book's argument centers on the claim that the unique legal and political status of Native American tribes as sovereign nations fundamentally shapes Native Americans’ views toward these institutions and norms that form the American legal system.

"International Courts and the Politics of Democratic Backsliding.'' With Sivaram Cheruvu.
Abstract
How can an international court expect to serve as a bulwark for democracy? This proposal develops a series of theory-motivated hypotheses and an accompanying survey-based research design to identify how and under what conditions an international court can protect democracy. We focus our argument on three factors. First, we argue that an international court’s effect on public support for democracy is conditioned by an individual’s attitude toward the court. As an individual’s trust in the court increases, the court will have a stronger impact. Second, we contend that the involvement of domestic institutions, particularly nonpartisan institutions such as courts and ombudsmen, in a case at an international court will strengthen its impact on public support for democratic norms. Third, we anticipate that the domestic political environment, specifically the proximity and competitiveness of national elections, will color citizens’ reception of international court decisions. Election campaigns may activate and magnify partisanship in ways that affect acceptance of an international court’s decision. We evalute these expectations through a series of observational and experimental analyses using an original survey dataset collected in Hungary in the weeks immediately preceding that country's 2022 parliamentary elections.

"Are Foreign-Appointed Judges More Independent? Evidence from the Andorran Constitutional Court.''
Abstract
Does delegating the appointment of constitutional court judges to foreigners ensure judicial independence? While adopted by only a small number of countries, the idea has grown in popularity among both legal scholars and policy experts as a selection method because it creates a judiciary unbound by domestic political in- terests. It remains an open empirical question, however, whether foreign-appointed judges are indeed more independent than domestically-appointed judges. I contend that the independence of foreign-appointed judges is weakened by their lacking the legitimacy conveyed through appointment by domestic political institutions. An analysis of judicial behavior at the Andorran Constitutional Court finds that foreign-appointed judges are responsive to political conditions, specifically the na- tional electoral cycle, while judges appointed by the domestic legislature are not. This responsiveness, however, manifests only in the admission of cases, not case disposition.

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Book Chapters

"The European Court of Justice." In Routledge Handbook of Judicial Behavior . Robert M. Howard and Kirk A. Randazzo (eds) Routledge Press (2018). With Matthew Gabel and Clifford Carrubba.

"Oral Hearings and Arguments." In Oxford Handbook of Comparative Judicial Behavior . Lee Epstein, Gunnar Grenstad, Urska Sadl, and Keren Weinshall (eds) Oxford University Press. Forthcoming.

"Judicial Communication Outside the U.S." In Research Handbook on Judicial Politics. Michael P. Fix and Matthew Montgomery (eds) Edward Elgar Publishing. Forthcoming.

Teaching

Undergraduate Courses

Introduction to Comparative Politics

Syllabus

Comparative Law and Politics

Syllabus

Western Democratic Governments

Syllabus

Graduate Courses

Formal Models

Syllabus

Comparative Judicial Politics and Institutions

Syllabus

Comparative Politics

Syllabus